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The Comptroller of the State of Connecticut commissioned the Center for 
Economic Analysis (CCEA) at the University of Connecticut to assess the state’s 
spending cap with respect to its adequacy for state budget (that is, general fund) growth 
in the face of escalating costs that are materially different from those to which the growth 
rule applies.  The spending cap is a rule that limits the state’s budget growth to the greater 
of a five-year moving average growth rate of Connecticut’s personal income (PI) or the 
annual rate of inflation measured by the growth of the Consumer Price Index (CPI).  The 
proposition addressed in this study is that the costs state governments face are materially 
and significantly different from the costs (prices) consumers face.  This situation is 
primarily due to differences in the composition of the ‘baskets’ of goods and services 
state governments and consumers purchase.  To the extent the growth rates of the ‘prices’ 
of these baskets differ, the state may suffer under its rule if the CPI/PI growth rate is 
insufficient for the state to meet its obligations. 
This study proposes a new growth rule (spending cap) that addresses the growing 
costs of health care, education, public safety and public administration.  The study 
describes the spending rules for the states which have them and places Connecticut in 
context (Appendix I).  It traces the history of the spending cap from its inception to the 
present (Appendix II). 
 
Major Findings 
Comparing Connecticut with its New England neighbors, the study shows the 
range of variation in state and combined state and local spending as shares of GSP or PI 
suggests that the restriction on spending growth has had to date no discernible systematic 
impact on the pattern of Connecticut’s expenditures, measured at either the state or at the 
combined state and local level. 
New England states’ public sector expenditures as shares of PI or GSP declined 
during the boom years of the 1990s, years that saw significant budget surpluses, and then 
grew again from about 1998, with state expenditure growing faster than contemporaneous 
growth in personal income or regional output, even as the growth rate itself declined.  
Second, the relevant standard for a spending cap is arguably combined state and local 
i  
expenditure, not state expenditure alone—especially as the state has ramped up its 
transfers to local government.  Local expenditures are typically nearly a quarter of total 
public sector expenditure; a spending cap that ignores the interdependence between state 
and local expenditure may result in significant increases in the inequality of local tax 
burdens, inequalities that may then generate negative feedbacks on a variety of areas, 
including economic competitiveness.   
Third, insofar as the level of public services has a positive impact on economic 
performance and competitiveness (e.g., higher quality education, support for research and 
development, or superior access to health care, labor markets and goods and services 
markets),
1 Connecticut’s spending cap may undermine its long-term capacity to maintain 
its current position as one of the two or three wealthiest states in the nation.
2  Fourth, the 
comparative analysis suggests that Connecticut might adopt a growth formula that 
permits it to retain its comparative position relative to its neighbors and enable it to 
respond to recognized needs for public expenditure or the need to sustain or enhance its 
competitive position through strategic investments.  Such a formula might exclude all 
federal funds and avoid annual rebasing, which now produces a downward “ratcheting” 
effect.  Given that the constitutional amendment permits the legislature to adopt 
interpretive language, it would be feasible to craft an appropriate formulaic framework. 
CCEA develops a new price index that captures the dynamic costs of the basket of 
goods that state and local governments actually purchase and the increasing costs and 
utilization of Medicaid services due to increasing child poverty, the slow recovery from 
the recession and the aging population.
3  It combines the state and local GDP deflator 
(SLGD) with the growth rate of Connecticut’s expenditure on Medicaid.  An examination 
of the state and local GDP deflator shows it is growing at a slightly faster rate than the 
CPI.  The SLGD is a broad-based, well-documented, and consistently maintained 
measure of state and local government expenditure.  We portray the new index as a five-
year moving average of the weighted annual growth rates of Connecticut’s Medicaid 
                                                 
1 David Alan Aschauer has written extensively on the relation of public investment and the productivity of 
private capital; see http://abacus.bates.edu/~daschaue/cv.html. 
2 Its rank varies depending on the measure, e.g., per capita income or median household income. 
3 The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid Facts, November 2004, www.kff.org, publication #7220 and 
Holahan and Ghosh (2005), “Understanding the Recent Growth in Medicaid Spending, 2000-2003,” Health 
Affairs, 10.1377/hlthaff.w5.52, Copyright © 2005 by Project HOPE, 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/abstract/hlthaff.w5.52 
ii  
expenditure and the SLGD.  To this, we add Connecticut’s historical trend growth of 
Medicaid enrollment. 
The chart below, reproduced from the body of the study, shows the new index in 
relation to CPI and SLGD inflation and in relation to the five-year moving average of 
Connecticut personal income.  It is immediately apparent that Connecticut has used the 
five-year moving average of the growth rate in its personal income as its spending rule, as 
the former has exceeded CPI inflation in every year since 1992.  The new index (in cyan) 
significantly exceeded personal income in the mid-1990s only to be briefly dominated by 
it in the last two years of the decade and the first two of the new century.  In 2002, the 
new index exceeds personal income growth by almost two percentage points allowing for 
growth in spending to meet Medicaid obligations among others.  In addition, we forecast 
through 2006 growth in the SLGD, personal income growth, and the new index.  Thus, 
while personal income growth is falling, the new index permits reasonable and sustained 
growth in Connecticut expenditure of 5.7% in 2005 and 2006. 
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Introduction and Background 
 
  The current budget process in Connecticut works within two separate constraints.  
The first is a “balanced budget requirement,” imposed through a state constitutional 
amendment that limits spending to available revenue.  The second is a limitation on the 
rate of growth in state spending.  While this restriction is included in the constitutional 
amendment, implementing legislation has never been adopted, so the actual restraint 
comes from legislation passed before the constitutional amendment was put to the voters.  
The Attorney General has ruled that the pre-existing statute would govern spending until 
the constitutional amendment is implemented through legislation.  Technically, therefore, 
Connecticut is not operating under its constitutional spending cap, but with a pre-existing 
statutory one.  The current Connecticut state spending rule uses the larger of the rate of 
inflation or the growth in personal income as the basis on which, fiscal year over fiscal 
year, most state spending can grow (that is, the general fund).   
This study focuses on the role of the spending cap in the formulating the state 
budget.  It places the history of Connecticut’s state and local spending patterns in the 
context of its pattern of growth and measures it relative to its wealth, as measured by 
either gross regional product or aggregate personal income.  It also situates the 
Connecticut experience in comparison to similar metrics for Connecticut’s neighbors.  
The following section examines a crucial element of the spending cap: what an 
alternative, appropriate measure of the rate of inflation for the cost of government-
provided services might be and suggests a prototype index by which to measure that rate.  
Finally, the study includes appendices that describe revenue and spending rules used by 
other states and a chronology of Connecticut’s experience with its spending cap. 
 
Connecticut’s Spending Cap: Paper Tiger or Serious Constraint? 
In 1992, Connecticut adopted what appeared to be a strict constitutional spending 
cap, with two components.  First, it limited general budget expenditures to no more than 
anticipated revenues (a balanced budget requirement) and, second, it restricted growth in 
spending over the previous year’s authorized spending to the larger of the five-year 
moving average of the growth in personal income or the rate of inflation (CPI-U).  The 
1  
adoption of the spending cap, first in its statutory form and then as an amendment to the 
state’s constitution, was part of the political settlement that produced the state’s personal 
income tax.  The constitutional amendment has never been fully implemented because 
the limitation on spending growth required statutory interpretation of the terms “general 
budget expenditure,” “personal income,” and “rate of inflation.”  The legislature has not 
adopted the necessary interpretative laws; thus, based on an opinion of the Attorney 
General, the statutory language remains in effect, along with the constitutional balanced 
budget requirement. 
On its face, the spending cap appears to be comprehensive, covering nearly eighty 
(80) per cent of the authorized budget, excluding as a matter of law only interest 
payments on the state’s bonded debt, programs for distressed municipalities in place in 
1992, and the first year of mandated federal programs.  In fact, the legislature, working 
with the Governor, can and has exceeded the cap through the declaration of extraordinary 
circumstances (see Appendix II).  The legislature and the Governor could also redefine 
the base for the authorized budget, and/or, with enabling legislation, could exclude 
virtually any element of the budget from the capped “general budget expenditure.”  Thus, 
the spending cap is only as restrictive as the legislative process decides it should be; its 
strictures are not written in stone. 
Before looking at the cap itself—given that its objective is to control state 
spending—we place Connecticut’s pattern of public sector expenditure in perspective by 
looking at its historical rate of growth as a share of Gross State Product and Personal 
Income (hereafter GSP and PI).
4  After a period of rapid growth in the late 1980s, state 
expenditure as a share of both PI and GSP declined until the economic reversals late in 
the decade, reaching nearly 11.2% of personal income and 10% of GSP in 2002 (see 
Charts 2 – 5 below).  But this is misleading.  A more appropriate measure—because it 
reflects the total state and local tax burden actually borne by state residents—is to 
consider the pattern of state and local expenditure.  Municipalities, in many cases, get a 
significant share of their revenue from the state through intergovernmental transfers.  If 
the state chooses to reduce its transfers to municipalities or reduces some state programs 
                                                 
4 Gross State Product measures the value of goods and services produced in Connecticut in a given year on 
a value added basis.  Personal Income is a broad measure of income received by individuals from all 
sources. 
2  
that municipalities then attempt to sustain, local taxes necessarily go up, offsetting either 
cuts in state taxes or the foregone increases in state taxes that would have been necessary 
to sustain these expenditures at the state level.   
Chart 1 shows the trends for state intergovernmental transfers as shares of total 
state expenditure and of local revenue.  Chart 1 shows a rather flat share (between 16% 
and 18%) of state intergovernmental transfers in total state expenditure for 14 years, until 
1992, when there is a jump up to nearly 20%.  Then there is a sharp reversal, reducing 
state transfers in 1993 to 15.66%.  For municipalities, which had been increasingly reliant 
on transfers from the state (see the upper line in Chart 1), this meant a dramatic cut in 
support of just under 4% of their budget—moderately less than the cuts from the state 
would imply because, in aggregate, municipalities compensated by raising local taxes.  
From 1994 on, the trend share of intergovernmental transfers in state expenditure rises 
modestly until, in 1999, it turns sharply upward, reaching an unprecedented 20% in 2001.  
For municipalities, this meant that in aggregate about 30% of their budgets were now 
coming from the state.  This shift was the result of both the boom of the late 1990s with 
Connecticut’s resulting windfall in personal income tax revenue, and, recognition of the 
need to reduce the burden of local property taxes in sustaining local services, especially 
education.     
What Chart 1 does not show is how the increased state transfers to municipalities 
were distributed.  We suspect, however, that towns benefited differentially; the aggregate 
data presented does not show this.  Town level detail is not currently available.  
Nevertheless, there is nothing in the available data to suggest that the spending cap 
played any role in these shifts; they were apparently driven by revenues that the state had 
in hand.  Furthermore, this data is available up through 2000; the picture surely changed 
after the 2001 recession. 
3  
4 
Chart 1: CT Intergovermental Transfers as Shares of Total State Expenditure 
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Charts 2 through 5 show the patterns for state only and combined state and local 
expenditures as shares of Connecticut PI and GSP.  The overall trend in each case is 
upward (except for the period between 1993 and 1998) indicating that state and local 
governments took increasingly more of Connecticut residents’ personal income on the 
one hand and grew progressively larger as a portion of Connecticut’s economy on the 
other.  The exceptional period between 1993 and 1998 reflects perhaps the economic 
boom Connecticut then experienced when personal incomes grew faster than 
governments’ expenditures on the one hand, and when Connecticut’s value added (that is, 
GSP) grew faster than governments’ expenditures (denoting a relatively smaller public 
sector) on the other.  These trends roughly mimic those of Chart 1.  
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Chart 6 shows the trends of state spending per capita and state and local spending 
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per capita with respect to PI and GSP per capita.  Each trend slopes upward between 
1977 and 2002.  These trends imply that as nominal, average personal incomes (that i
per capita and not adjusted for inflation) increased, the state’s ability to tax in terms of 
income (after 1992) and consumption increased, and the state and local governments 
spent more in response to increased nominal income.  In addition, as Connecticut’s va
added (its GSP) increased, the state and its municipalities spent more.  GSP represents the 
payments to all factors of production including labor, capital and land.  As such payments  
increased, the state’s and its municipalities’ ability to raise revenue from capital and land 
increased, and they spent more on average per person.  In other words, state and local 
governments got larger. 
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  Looking at the expenditure patterns in Connecticut does not show how the state 





appreciating the pattern of demand for public sector expenditure and for the competitive
context, insofar as tax burdens influence overall economic performance and the 
attractiveness of the state for business.  Prof. Dennis Heffley, in a study published in the 
fall 2002 issue of The Connecticut Economy, showed that Connecticut had a rem
“lean” public sector, whether measured by employees, share of personal income, or other
measures.  Indeed, it had one of the leanest public sectors in the nation (see Exhibit A). 
7  








































  Charts 8 and 9 show state and state and local expenditures as shares in GSP for 
Connecticut and five northeastern states: Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Jersey, New 
York, and Pennsylvania.  Each chart is net of federal transfers, again capturing state and 
local expenditures funded from taxes on the residents and businesses of each state.  
Charts 9 and 10 show the time paths of state and state and local expenditures as shares in 
PI for Connecticut and these same five northeastern states.  They show that, whether 
measured against regional product, personal income, and aggregate public sector 
expenditures—state and local spending combined—are smaller shares in Connecticut 
than in Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, or Pennsylvania.  It is 
striking that, while Massachusetts and New Jersey are modestly higher in terms of 
spending shares than Connecticut, the other states are twenty (20) to forty (40) percent 
higher.  To achieve this level of performance, Connecticut jointly at the state and local 
levels must provide fewer public services than these neighboring states, provide public 
sector services more efficiently, or a combination of both.  It is also worth noting that 
Connecticut public sector expenditure, even with the significant growth in 2001-2002, 
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ent.  Local expenditures are typically nearly a quarter of total public sector 
xpenditures; a spending cap that ignores the interdependence between state and local 
expenditure m
tes 
Several implications flow from these descriptive statistics.  First, the range of 
variation in the share of GSP or PI suggests that the restriction on spending growth has 
had to date no discernible systematic impact on the pattern of Connecticut’s expenditures, 
whether measured at just the state level or, more appropriately, at the aggregate state and 
local level.  Public sector expenditures as a share of PI or GSP declined during the boom 
years of the 1990s, years that saw significant budget surpluses, and then grew again from 
about 1998, with state expenditure growing faster than contemporaneous growth in 
personal income or regional output, even as the growth rate itself declined.  Second, the 
relevant standard for a spending cap is arguably state and local expenditure, not state 
expenditure alone—especially as the state has ramped up its transfers to local 
governm
e
ay result in significant increases in the inequality of local tax burdens, 
inequalities that may then generate negative feedbacks on a variety of areas, including 
economic competitiveness.  Third, insofar as the level of public services has a positive 
impact on economic performance and competitiveness (e.g., higher quality education, 
support for research and development, or superior access to health care, labor markets 
and goods and services markets),
5 Connecticut’s spending cap may undermine its long-
term capacity to maintain its current position as one of the two or three wealthiest sta
                                                 
5 David Alan Aschauer has written extensively on the relation of public investment and the productivity




6  Fourth, the comparative analysis suggests that Connecticut mig
spending formula that permits it to retain its comparative position relative to its neares
neighbors but still enables it to respond to recognized needs for public expenditure or th
need to sustain or enhance its competitive position through strategic investments.  Suc
formula might exclude all federal funds and avoid annual rebasing, which produces a 
downward “ratcheting” effect.  Given that the constitutional amendment permits the 
legislature to adopt interpretive language, it would be feasible to craft an appropriate 
formulaic framework. 
Another perspective from which to evaluate the spending cap is to consider how 
the cap relates to the larger authorized budget.  Despite the concerns that the exclusion of
interest payments on state bonds might lead to a pattern in which the budget hides current
services expenditures in debt service—a shift that would be reflected in a declining ratio
of the capped budget to the total budget—that shift does not seem to be occurring.  The 
FY 2002 budget showed the capped portion ($11,028 million) to be about the same as in 
earlier years, that is, eighty (80) percent.  However, there clearly has been a “ratchetin
effect.  That is, under current statutory restrictions, any year in which the “authorized
budget” is less than the growth permitted for that year, lowers the spending cap for the
following year.  Thus, i










n difficult years, when there is insufficient revenue, the legislative 
process
ate 
 cuts the budget below what the formula permits; then in all subsequent years the 
spending cap is lowered.  This locks the state into a process that must necessarily and 
progressively, reduce state spending, regardless of revenues or needs.  Chart 12 shows 
what would have happened over the years if the capped budget had grown each year by 
the maximum permitted under the law and contrasts this with what actually has 
happened.  Until 2002, the budget tracked what the formula permitted closely, but in the 
last three fiscal years the budget has fallen further and further from what a “fixed” base 
formula would have permitted.  This shows the impact of the “ratcheting effect”; the st
spending cap is now about $1 billion below what it would have been without the 
“ratcheting” effect.   
                                                 
6 Its rank varies depending on the measure, e.g., per capita income or median household income. 
11  
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The cap, as calculated under the statutory requirement, is now more than $1 
billion below what it could have been, as note above.  However, this appears to be the 
result of the limitations that declining tax revenues imposed, hence the result of the 
balanced budget restriction, not the result of the spending cap itself.  Moreover, when the 
state, during the late 1990s, enjoyed high revenues, the budgetary process found no 
obstacles to spending those monies.  Thus the spending cap may have rhetorical value, 
but there is little to suggest that is has played a meaningful role to date in shaping the 
Connecticut state budget. 
  Assuming Connecticut wants to retain its presumptive advantage of a lean public 






gative impacts, and preserve its comparative advantage in tax 
d GSP to support state and local public services, while enabling it to make 
strategic public sector investments that are central to sustaining its competitive position
reasonable approach would be to benchmark its spending and/or institutional restrain
against the patterns in neighboring states (or nationally), and to incorporate tax incidence 
analysis into its tax strategy.  This would permit the state to construct tax policy in w
that minimize actual burdens, through recognition of the interdependence of state and 
local taxes and federal rules, and reduce inequalities at the local level, inequalities that
can generate significant ne
12  
burdens.  The constitutional provisions on the spending cap provide sufficient flexibility 
in defining the controlling terms that Connecticut can achieve this balanced approach 
within the required framework. 
 
An Alternative Spending Rule 
The spending cap—whether the current statutory standard or the constitutional 
language—invokes two standards for controlling the growth of spending.  One is the 
growth in personal income; the second is the rate of inflation.  However, measuring the
rate of change in prices is complex, depending on what “basket of goods” is purchased.
The conventional Consumer Price Index (CPI)—which the media widely reports and 
most people think of as the standard for measuring inflation—measures prices “paid by 
urban consumers for a market basket of consumer goods and services.”
 
  
of goods and services different from the basket of the 
oods and services used to develop the CPI.  Simply put, the CPI tracks the prices 
 time, not governments. 





7  The State of 
Connecticut purchases a bundle 
g
relevant to urban consumers over
Inflation (deflation) measures the increase (decrease) in the general level of pric
of goods and services in some basket.  There are several ways to measure inflation in 
economy.  According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), “The ‘best’ measure of 
inflation for a given application depends on the intended use of the data.”  Further, the 
BLS points out that, “The CPI is generally the best measure for adjusting payments to
consumers when the intent is to allow consumers to purchase, at today’s prices, a market
basket of goods and services equivalent to one that they could purchase in an earlier 
period.”  Thus, the official CPI looks at the prices of goods and services in a consumer’
basket, neither of which bears a meaningful relationship to those that the State of 
Connecticut purchases.  
    An important measure of the strength of a nation’s economy is GDP
8 growth.  
When creating the National Index and Products Accounts (NIPA), the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) distinguishes between GDP growth that inflation generates 
                                                 
7 BLS website’s FAQ “What is the CPI?” http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpifaq.htm#Question_1, January 31, 
2005. 
d 
8 GDP is a measure of the value of all goods and services produced in a region in a year on a value adde
basis. 
13  
(that is, from a general rise in prices) and GDP growth that results from an expanding 
economy (that is, from creating more physical goods and services).  The BEA does this 
by deflating (adjusting) nominal GDP to obtain real GDP; that is, BEA takes price 
growth out of GDP so that the comparison over time is in “constant dollars” or real 
(physical) terms.  To make this adjustment, BEA decides on a measure of inflation
argued above, governments and other sect
.  As 










personal incomes (heavy magenta and cyan lines). 
services and thus experience different rates of inflation.  Recognizing this, the BEA 
creates and publishes a series of deflators for different sectors of the economy, inc
one for state and local governments.   
  An option that may be more appropriate in capturing the changing pattern of sta
and local spending behavior is the BEA state and local government GDP deflator (a 
measure of the price level that state and local governments face).  Below we charac
the trends of personal income in the U.S. and Connecticut, as well as the CPI and the
state and local GDP deflator (hereafter SLGD).  Chart 13 shows U.S. and Connecticut 
personal income converted to indices (1980 =100) compared to the CPI and the SLGD 
(also converted to indices) with respect to time.  This allows us to observe relative 
changes (growth rates) on a comparable basis.  We observe that U.S. and Connecticut 
personal income track closely for 25 ye
in s in Connecticut and the U.S. have grown faster than either measure of the general 
price level that urban consumers face or that state and local governments face.  This i
evident in Chart 14, which shows the growth rates (year-to-year percent changes) in the 
four variables.  The growth rates of personal incomes in the U.S. and Connecticut are 
only larger, represented by the top two curves in blue and magenta, they are more 
variable or volatile than either measure of inflation.     
  Connecticut’s spending rule allows the capped portion of the budget to grow
the larger of a five-year moving average of Connecticut personal income and the 
(national) CPI.  The five-year moving average smoothes the variability as shown in Chart 
15 which repeats the underlying growth rates of U.S. and Connecticut personal incomes 
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There is some concern that Connecticut’s cost of living differs from the national 
averages.  To address this we examine CPI data for several regions to compare them to 
the national average.  Charts 16 and 17 shows CPIs and their growth rates respectively 
from the 1) U.S. city average, New York – Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-
CT-PA, 2) the Northeast urban CPI, and 3) the CPI for Boston-Brockton-Nashua, MA-
NH-ME-CT.  Charts 16 and 17 suggest that over the past 20 year the general price level 
in the northeast region of the nation has been growing slightly faster than the national 
average.  However, Chart 16 shows that the regional CPI growth rates are highly 
correlated with the national pattern.  In fact, the average annual growth rates over the 24-
year period differ by less than 0.4%.  Notwithstanding, a regional consumer CPI still does 
not capture the types of goods purchased by state and local governments. 
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17  
The State and Local Government GDP Deflator  
  According to the BEA, the state and local government GDP deflator (hereafter 
SLGD) derives from “data on the finances of state and local governments.”
9  As the 
CPI’s market basket of goods and services track purchases of urban consumers, so the 
SLGD arises from the “basket” of goods and services that state and local governments’ 
purchase. 
This SLGD is an implicit price deflator (IPD), meaning that is an aggregation of 
several indexes representing different categories of state and local government spending.  
The BEA adjusts the weights and components of this basket of indexes as the 
composition of state and local government expenditures change over time.  We regard 
this price index as a starting point for a new index because it is broad-based, well 
documented, regularly maintained, and methodologically sound.  
In 1988, the BEA published the methodology and a complete list of indexes and 
weights for the 1982 SLGD.  It consists of four major IPDs (durable goods, nondurable, 
goods, services and structures) that are on average an aggregate of 25 different indexes 
produced by various government organizations, such as the BLS, the EPA and the 
BEA.
10  Each index is weighted to represent the goods and services that state and local 
governments purchase (we assume such goods and services are quite similar).  We 
describe some of the major components of the SLGD below. 
 
Compensation for State Employees 
  State worker compensation represents 61% of the entire SLGD.  To measure the 
changing compensation costs of state employees, the BEA creates IPDs for different 
types of employment.  The IPDs are then assigned weights based on the portion of state 
                                                 
9 U.S. Department of Commerce and the Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Government Transactions, 
Methodology Papers: U.S. National Income and Product Accounts,” November 1988. 
http://www.bea.gov/bea/articles/NATIONAL/NIPA/Methpap/methpap5.pdf 
10 The implicit GDP deflator for example is the value of all goods and services produced in the U.S. in the 
current year divided by their chained dollar value.  Th latter is the value of all goods and services 
roduced in the U.S. in a reference year (now 1996) times the chain-type quantity index for the current 





and local governments’ budgets.  This IPD for services accounts for 75% of the total 
s these costs and they are included in creating the SLGD.  While there is no 
IPD cre  
D and has 




ance payments, medical 
ayments, income maintenance payments, unemployment insurance payments, and 
profit institutions serving individuals include Job 
Trainin
deflator, it would overstate inflation through a ratchet effect.
12  This is because some 
transfer payments are already indexed to a measure of inflation, such as Social Security 
payments.  Including these inflation adjusted payments in an index to adjust for inflation 
would overstate the extent of that very inflation. 




Another major component of state and local budgets is education expenditure.  
NIPA track
ated specifically for education, its expenditure components appear in every major
category.  Under the IPD for services, education compensation contributes approximately 
33% of the entire SLGD.  The IPD for structures comprises of 12% of the SLG
a component that tracks the costs of education buildings.  Twelve percent the IPD for 
durable goods (4% of SLGD) is expenditure for “books and other durable printed 
material” (0.5% of SLGD), while 3% of the nondurable goods IPD
8 iture for “pens, pencils and other marking devices.”
 
Limitations of the State and Local Government Deflator 
The principal shortcoming of the SLGD is that it does not include state trans
payments in its calculation.  These are state (we do not consider federal payments) 
payments to individuals and nonprofit institutions serving individuals.  Payments to
individuals consist primarily of retirement and disability insur
p
payments to veterans.  Payments to non
g Partnership Act payments and educational assistance.
8  Such payments are 
obviously expenditures that must be budgeted. 
If the BEA included transfer payments in the state and local government GDP 
                                                 
11 U.S. Department of Commerce and the Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Government Transactions, 
e 
Methodology Papers: U.S. National Income and Product Accounts,” November 1988, 
http://www.bea.gov/bea/articles/NATIONAL/NIPA/Methpap/methpap5.pdf. 
12 At What Price?  Conceptualizing and Measuring Cost-of-Living and Price Indexes, Charles L. Schulz
and Christopher Mackie, National Research Council, National Academy Price. 
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Medicaid is a transfer payment in state budgets.  The National Association of 
State Budget Officers (NASBO) publishes an annual report of state expenditures that 
acks and projects the portion of states’ budgets spent on Medicaid.  In 2003, Medicaid 
 25.3% of total expenditures for the State of Connecticut, slightly higher than 




ecticut have experienced sharp 
for the U.S. and 
tr
consisted of
onal average of 21.4%.
13  Medicaid is a significant part of the basket of goods a
services that the State of Connecticut purchases.  However, NASBO apparently includes
the federal portion of Medicaid in its estimation of the Medicaid share in total state 
expenditure (personal communication with NASBO).  CCEA believes the important 
concept is the state’s burden for Medicaid exclusive of the federal contribution.  Chart 18 
shows vendor payments (that match Medicaid expenditure from the Connecticut gener
fund in the NASBO 2003 State Expenditure Report) for Connecticut and the U.S. a
shares in total expenditure from the Census Bureau’s data on state expenditures. 
 
The story is clear: both the U.S. and Conn
increases in the shares of their budgets that support Medicaid.  The increases were 
especially large in the early 1990s; after 1995 they level off at about 9% 
                                                 
13 State Expenditure Report 2003, NASBO. 
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the escalation of costs of Medicaid because the burden faced by states is price multiplied 
r Connecticut.  For at least 25 years, Connecticut has contributed a larger shar
its budget to Medicaid than the federal government has.  Excluding Medicaid expendit
or some proxy characterizing the underlying cost drivers from an index meant to 
characterize state spending behavior would be misleading.  Other transfer payments are 
not included and we do not know the precise level or composition of the state’s portion of 
these payments from Census data.   
  The growth of the states’ Medicaid expenditures captures both the increasing
costs due to inflation and those from the growth of Medicaid services due to additiona
enrollments, increased uptake rates, and increased usage.  National Medicaid enrollment 
has been increasing since 1999.  Though the enrollment rate slowed from a 9.8% increase
in 2002 to a projected 4.7% increase in 2005,
14 increases in total enrollment contribut
by quantity.  An index used to track the costs (burden) faced by state and local 
governments should consider this large and growing component of spending.  NASBO 
tracks the annual percentage change in Medicaid expenditures that appear annually in 
their state expenditure report.  This growth rate and those of state tax revenue, the CPI, 
and the SLGD appear in Chart 19.  The story is clear: the average states’ Medicaid 
spending has grown faster than state tax revenues, and faster than other measures of 
general price growth (inflation).  The negative growth in state tax revenue that Chart 19 
shows in 2002 and 2003 reflects the lingering effects of the recession. 
 
                                                 
14 Eileen R. Ellis, Vernon K. Smith and David M. Rousseau, Medicaid Enrolment in the 50 States, June 
edicaid and the Uninsured, September 2004.  2003 Data Update, Kaiser Commission on M
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Average Medicaid Spending Growth (NASBO)
Growth in State Tax Revenue (NASBO)
Annual change in the CPI All Items for Urban Consumers (BLS)
Annual percentage change in SLGD (BEA)
 
Indexing Medical Costs 
  Given that the current SLG-CPI does not include Medicaid expenditure, and g
the large and growing share of state expenditures devoted to this area, it is clearly 
important to augment the SLG-CPI to capture this cost component.  Ch
iven 
art 20 shows the 
rowth rates for federal Medicaid and total federal expenditure in absolute and per capita 
terms.  The spike in growth rates of federal spending reflects the increase in 
government’s share of Medicaid spending in the early 1990s.  Chart 21 repeats the trends 
of Chart 20 for Connecticut.    
  Unfortunately, there is currently no published price index or deflator that 
measures the cost of Medicaid’s basket of goods and services to state and local 
governments.  A feasible approach to developing such an index is to develop a reasonable 











































Growth Rate US Total Exp Growth Rate US Total Exp Per Capita
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Growth Rate CT Total Exp Growth Rate CT Total Exp Per Capita
Growth Rate CT Total Medicaid Payments Growth Rate CT Total Medicaid Payments Per Capita 
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hanges in expenditures better than the Medical indexes analyzed.  Chart 22 shows the 
CPI lies above indexes for state and local health and hospital charges in government 
The Medical Consumer Price Index (MCPI) 
CCEA considers the Medical Consumer Price Index (MCPI) and its sub-indexes 
as a measure of the price level of fundamental medical costs.  The MCPI measures the 
costs individual consumers without insurance face when purchasing medical 
commodities and services.  The MCPI and its sub-indexes track list prices for the services 
it measures.  Just as the prices that insurance companies pay for private health care differ 
from those the uninsured pay, the list prices used in MCPI are not the prices state and 
local governments face when purchasing goods and services under Medicaid.  Medicaid 
has a reimbursement schedule; it does not pay the list prices that the MCPI measures.  
Because list prices are higher than negotiated prices or reimbursement rates, indexing the 
State of Connecticut portion of its budget using the MCPI would overstate the growth 
rate and level of the underlying prices driving medical costs.  
  However, comparing the growth in national and Connecticut payments to 
Medicaid to the growth rates of various medical indexes, the MCPI seems to track the 
c
M
consumption expenditure, a federal medical care price index, and federal price indexes 
for medical care for gross domestic purchases.  The MCPI necessarily lies below the 
indexes for Connecticut and U.S. expenditures for Medicaid because those indexes reflect 
the combination of both increased utilization and increased costs of services. 
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torical trend growth of 
edica
dex 
CCEA develops below an index that captures the dynamic costs of the basket of
goods that state and local governments actually purchase and the increasing co
utilization of Medicaid services due to increasing child poverty, the slow recovery from 
the recession and the aging population.
15  It combines the state and local GDP deflator 
(SLGD) with the growth rate of Connecticut’s expenditure on Medicaid.  An examinat
of the state and local GDP deflator shows it is growing at a slightly faster rate than the 
CPI.  The SLGD is a broad-based, well-documented, and consistently maintained 
measure of state and local government expenditure.  We portray the new index as a five-
year moving average of the weighted annual growth rates of Connecticut’s Medicaid 
expenditure and the SLGD.  To this, we add Connecticut’s his
M id enrollment. 
                                                 
15 The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid Facts, November 2004, www.kff.org, publication #7220 and 
Holahan and Ghosh (2005), “Understanding the Recent Growth in Medicaid Spending, 2000-2003,” Health




For example, in 2002, Connecticut’s Medicaid expenditure was $2,585,307,000,
representing, when adding the federal one-for-one match, 18.7% of the budget.  In 200
Medicaid spending grew 6.75% from the previous year.  The SLGD grew 2.38% from the 
previous year and represents 81.3% (the remainder) of state spending for 2002
 
2, 
.  The 
weighted average growth rate for 2002 is 3.2%.  We take the five-year moving average of 
ay downsize, reducing the availability of health facilities to all regardless of wealth.  
he bottom line is that the new index, shown in Chart 24 below, allows the limit on state 
xpenditure to grow according to a rule that recognizes that a major component of state 
ws more rapidly than the conventional CPI or personal income. 
 
these growth rates to smooth variation; this yields 3.38% for 2002.  To this we add the 
historical trend growth rate of Connecticut’s Medicaid enrollment (2.25%), capturing 
increasing utilization irrespective of underlying price changes and government strategies 
to reduce exposure (the article in footnote 10 describes cost containment strategies 
adopted by the states, and Governor Rell’s budget recommends reductions to current 
services along these lines
16).  States have limited discretion over the federal Medicaid 
program in terms of who qualifies, of what procedures and drugs are covered, and of the 
amount of re-imbursement.  They have great discretion over the state funded SCHIP 
programs for which they can influence reimbursement rates and eligibility requirements, 
as well as which procedures and drugs are covered and by how much.  In addition, as 
states move to a managed care model, they can cap transfers to providers, reducing or 
constraining their health care expenditure.  Of course, downward expenditure pressure 
has a limit: providers may cease to offer services to the Medicaid population and at the 





Chart 23 shows actual Connecticut Medicaid enrollment since 1991 and the trend
whose slope (2.25%) represents the secular growth rate of Medicaid enrollment in 
Connecticut.  Reflected in this graph are the discretionary changes in the SCHIP 
program. 
                                                 
16 http://www.opm.state.ct.us/budget/2006-2007Books/BigBook/Part2Detail/HumanSvcLong.pdf. 
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Chart 23: Connecticut Medicaid Enrollment & Trend

















































Medicaid Enrollee Population (Thousands) Linear (Medicaid Enrollee Population (Thousands))
 
Chart 24 shows the new index in relation to the inflation in the CPI and the SL
and in relation to the five-year moving average of Connecticut personal income.  It is 
immediately apparent that Connecticut has used the five-year moving average of the 
growth rate in its personal income as the spending rule, as the former has exceeded C
inflation in every year since 1992.  The new index (in cyan) significantly exceeded 
personal income in the mid-1990s only to be briefly dominated by it in the last two yea
of the decade and the first two of the new century.  In 2002, the new index exceeds 
personal income growth by almost two percentage points allowing for growth in spendi
to meet Medicaid obligations.  In addition, we forecast through 2006 growth in the 
SLGD, personal income growth, and the new index.  Thus, while personal income grow
is falling, the new index permits reasonable and sustained growth in expenditure of 5.7%




























































CT PI 5-year moving avg.
Annual Inflation (CPI)
Annual Inflation (SLGD)
New Index Growth Rate (5-year moving avg. using 1-yr avg. of CT Medicaid Exp. Growth) 
Appendix I: Spending Rules of the States 
 
Introduction  
  We distinguish between states’ self-imposed institutional constraints on revenue 
and spending that consist of balanced budget and carry-over rules, veto types, citizen 
initiatives and elected or appointed Supreme Courts on the one hand and rules that define 
the growth or level of spending at the state level (a revenue rule limits spending).  In this 
section, we explicate the state level tax and expenditure limitations (STELs) currently 
used in twenty-eight states.  We do not show spending or revenue constraints that states 
impose on sub-state jurisdictions such as municipalities or counties.  The approaches 
used to limit expenditures vary state by state.  The majority of states limit appropriations, 
a preemptive measure.  Appropriations are funds that are allocated for targeted spending 
in the state’s budget.  Some states limit expenditures and spend up to the limit.  These 
states do not necessarily spend the maximum amount under the limit, and this can further 
restrict the amount they are able to spend under the cap, by decreasing the base to which 
the spending rule applies in the next budget cycle.  Some states cap revenue growth, 
which can sometimes be more effective than spending restrictions, because in limiting the 
states’ income, insufficient funds must be borrowed to meet obligations.   
  The underlying measure (basis) to which the cap is applied varies across the 
states.  Expenditure limitations can be tied to growth in personal income, population, 
wages and salaries, or to inflation.  These growth guides make sense, as increased 
population will likely demand more public services.  As personal income increases, 
citizens are likely to demand more and higher quality public services (that is, we assume 
that the government services are normal goods).  Increasing population and increasing 
personal incomes also mean a larger base from which to extract revenue.  On the other 
hand, if both personal incomes and population are increasing, but per capita income is 
decreasing, the base in terms of a household’s ability to pay can be decreasing.   
  Inflation is an insidious tax that reduces the purchasing power of money meaning 
that it costs more today to purchase the same quantity of goods and services than it did 
last month or last year.  Even if personal incomes and population do not grow, inflation 
makes provision of a given basket of services more expensive (in nominal terms).  
29  
Regardless of a household’s ability to pay, a growing population requires more public 
rvices, although if segments of the population are poorer in real (inflation-adjusted) 
ant their tax burdens to reflect their actual economic status despite 
 
, 







terms, they may w
higher prices governments must pay for the goods and services it consumes. 
  Expenditure limits are only as effective as they are enforced.  If there are easy 
ways to circumvent spending limits, then rules will be less effective.  If the governor has 
veto power, then funds can be spent with his signature, and this reduces the strength of an
expenditure limitation.  If much of the government spending does not fall under the cap
there will also be a reduction in the effect of the spending limitation. 
 
State’s Spending Rules 
  This section focuses on the revenue and/or expenditure rules in each state and 
compares Connecticut’s expenditure limitation with other states.      
  Alaska’s growth of appropriations is tied to population and inflation growth.  The 
spending cap applies to general funds, which are 86% of state revenues.  Federal and 
other funds are excluded. 
  Arizona passed a Constitutional Amendment in 1978 based on which 
appropriations are limited to 7.23% of personal income.  State revenues do
receipts from bonds or other lawful long-term obligations, dividends or interest, gran
aid, contributions of gifts of any type, amounts or property received by the state in the
capacity of trustee, custodian or agent, amounts received from employers for depos
the unemployment compensation fund or any successor fund, receipts from the sale, 
or redemption of property, amounts received pursuant to a transfer during a fiscal year 
from another agency, department, office, board, commission, authority, council or 
institution of the state which were included as state revenues for such fiscal year.  The 
spending limitation applies to general funds and revenues of certain type for example, 
taxes, licenses, and university fees.  Federal funds are excluded from the cap. 
  California passed a Constitutional Amendment in 1979 establishing that the 
growth of appropriations shall not be greater than the growth of personal income and 
population.  Taxes, bond revenues, federal funds and all fees are included under this rule
30  
  Unlike most states in this study, Colorado passed a law in 1991 establishing a 
limit in the growth of appropriations to 6% of prior year’s appropriations or an amount
equal to 5% of Colorado personal income.  The constraint applies to the entire  budget






eyond the existing level of service; or (3) any state general fund appropriation of any 
 from any increase in the rate or amount of any tax or fee 
i ts Constitutional 
mend
al 







personal income in the ensuing fiscal year as determined by the economic estimates 
appropriation which, as a result of any requirement of federal law, is made for any new
program or service or for any increase in the level of service for an existing program 
beyond the existing level of service; or (2) any state general fund appropriation which, as 
a result of any requirement of a final state or federal court order, is made for any new 
program or service or for any increase in the level of service for an ex
b
moneys which are derived
which is approved by a majority of the registered electors of the state voting at any 
general election.  Colorado voters approved a Taxpayer’s Bill of R gh
A ment in 1992.  It limits expenditures to the growth of population and inflation.  
Revenue exceeding the limit must be refunded.  Maximum spending change must equ
inflation plus the percentag
Annual federal census estimates determine population.  Moreover, concerning
limitations, new or increased transfer tax rates on real property are prohibited.  No new 
real property tax or local district income tax shall be imposed.  Neither an income tax rat
increase nor a new state definition of taxable income shall apply before the next tax yea
  Delaware passed a Constitutional Amendment in 1980 that limits appropriations 
to 98% of estimated revenues.  The rule applies to the general budget.  Federal funds and 
transportation and appropriated special funds are excluded. 
  Florida’s Constitution established in 1994 that revenue growth be limited to
five-year average of personal income growth.  State revenues are limited to state revenu
allowed for the prior fiscal year plus an adjustment for growth.  “Growth” means an 
amount equal to the average annual rate of growth in Florida personal income over the 
most recent twenty quarters times the state revenues for the prior fiscal year. 
  Hawaii’s growth of appropriations is limited to the three-year average of perso
income growth. 
  Since 1980, Idaho limits spending of general fund revenues to 5.33% of total state 
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c ssion.  One time general fund appropriations are not included in this rule.  The 
spending cap is tied to revenues but there is no rule that establishes what portion of 
revenues.  It depends on the year and the specific amounts; however, the cap includes a
expenditure categories. 
   Iowa enacted a spending rule in 1992, according to which general fund 
expenditures are limited to 99% of the adjusted estimate of state revenue.  Dedicated 
funds, gas tax, maintenance funds, funds for the construction of highways, and federal 
funds are excluded from the cap. 
  Revenue growth in Louisiana has been tied to the ratio of fiscal year 1978-79 t
revenue to 1977 state personal income following 1979’s statutory code.  The State Tax 
Revenue Limit is rounded to the nearest tenth of one percent.  State tax revenue inclu
all funds received from sales and use, income, gift, inheritance, excise, property, lice
corporations, franchise, and all other taxes, charges and fees.  State revenue does not 
include federal funds, royalties, interagency transfers, proceeds from the First Use Tax,
severance taxes, or self-generated funds.  Moreover, since 1993 Louisiana has a 
Constitutional Amendment limiting the growth of appropriations to per capital pers
income growth.  The expenditure limit applies to all general funds from which federal 
funds are excluded 
  Massachusetts amended its statutory code in 1998 with a tax revenue growth limit 








yond this percentage are 
xpenditures 
specified revenue growth to be tied to inflation in government spending plus 2%.  
  Michigan limits revenues to 9.49% of the immediately prior 3-year average of 
personal income, a rule ratified in 1978.  Excess revenues be
refunded to taxpayers.  The revenue limitation can be exceeded only in case of 
emergency.  No expenses of state government may be incurred which exceed the revenue 
limit.  
  Since 1992, according to its statutory code, Mississippi limits appropriations to 
98% of projected revenue for the succeeding fiscal year.  The total proposed e
of the overall budget shall not exceed the amount of estimated revenues.  The limitation 
includes all funds except federal funds. 
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  Missouri amended its constitution in 1980 that limits revenue to the ratio of fisc
year 1980-1981 state revenue to calendar year 1979 state personal income (5.64%) 
multiplied by the greater of state personal income in the previous calendar year or the 
average state personal in
al 
come over the previous three calendar years.  “Total state 
 federal 
 








ear of the 
 all proposed appropriations from the state general fund.  
al 
 
r’s elections fund are excluded from the 
spending limitation. 
revenues” include all general and special revenues, licenses and fees, excluding
funds and the amounts of any credits based on actual tax liabilities but includes the 
amount of any credits not related to actual tax liabilities.  The limitation applies only to
general funds, which consist of 38
(30.9%) and other funds (31.1 %) are excluded from the cap. 
  Montana specified in its statutes in 198 that growth of appropriations is tied to 
personal income growth.  “State expenditures” includes general fund appropriations, the 
special revenue fund type appropriations, and the cash portion of the appropriations in the
capital projects fund type, and excludes federal funds, payments of principal and inter
on bonded indebtedness, money paid for unemployment or disability insurance benefits, 
money received from the sale of goods or services provided that the purchase of t
goods or services is discretionary, money paid from permanent endowments, 
constitutional trusts, or pension funds, proceeds of gifts or bequests made for purposes 
specified by the don
state government or used to purchase goods for resale.  This limitation covers 
approximately 63% of all funds. 
  Since 1979, Nevada’s expenditures are statutorily allowed to grow by the b
percentage change in population from the population on July 1, 1974.  Beyond the grow
in population, expenditures are allowed to grow by the rate of inflation.  It covers 100%
of general funds, excluding federal funds.  The proposed budget of each fiscal y
biennium must provide for a reserve of neither less than 5% nor more than 10% of the 
total of
  Since 1990, expenditure growth in New Jersey has been tied to per capita person
income’s average annual increase over the past four years.  Grants, state aid, federal 
funds, capital, debt service, money in the property tax relief fund, the casino control fund
and casino revenue fund and the governo
33  
  In 1991, North Carolina legislated that the General Fund operating budget cannot 
exceed 7% of projected total state personal income for that fiscal year.  The General
operating budget accounts for 50% of the state budget, with federal funds, representing
30% of the operating budget, excluded from the cap. 
  Since 1985, Oklahoma’s spending has been tied to 95% of estimated revenue, an
not to exceed the prior year’s appropriations by 12% adjusted for inflation of the las
fiscal year.  Appropriations account for approximately 80% of the state appropriated 
budget.  Federal funds, fees and licenses (8% of the budget) are not included in the 










dget.  Federal funds are excluded. 
 the growth of 
d the 
es not 
  Oregon enacted a statute in 1979 limiting the growth of appropriations to person
income growth in Oregon in the two preceding calendar years.  Revenue received from 
excise taxes and corporate income is limited to 102% of estimated revenues, excluding 
federal funds, pensions, and loan and enterprise programs. 
  Since its 1992 constitutional amendment, Rhode Island’s appropriations have 
been tied to 98% of estimated state general revenues, excluding federal and restricted
funds, which are an insignificant fraction of the whole. 
  South Carolina amended its constitution from 1980 and 1984 such that spending
cannot exceed 9.5% of the average growth rate of the economy of the state.  The 
spending limitation applies to education and transportation funds that account f
approximately 35% of the total bu
  In 1978, Tennessee constitutionally adopted an appropriations growth limit tied to 
personal income growth.  In no year shall the rate of growth of appropriations from state 
tax revenues exceed the estimated rate of growth of the state’s economy.  Expenditures 
for any fiscal year shall not exceed the state’s revenues and reserves, including the 
proceeds of any debt obligation for that year.  
  In 1978, Texas amended its constitution such that it limits
appropriations to personal income growth.  In no biennium shall the rate of growth of 
appropriations from state tax revenues not dedicated by the Texas Constitution excee
estimated rate of growth of the state’s economy.  This rule applies only to the General 
Revenue Fund, which represents 53% of the entire state budget.  The limitation do
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apply to federal and constitutional funds, agency operating accounts, agency appropriated 
receipts, permanent funds, bonds, investment funds, nor lottery and retirement funds.  
  Since 1988, when Utah amended its statutory code, appropriations’ growth has 
been tied to inflation and population growth as well as to an average of changes in 
wth to the 
sistance, other social services, 
 




empt from the cap 
 
xed 
ouses in favor.  Federal funds, which make 
the 
pay a portion of the cost.  There is a chance that federal matching funds for a certain 
personal income.  General funds, school funds, transportation projects, federal funds, 
general obligatory revenue bonds, and the rainy day fund or emergency expenses are 
excluded.  Utah has placed limitations on the state mandated property tax and on the 
state’s outstanding general obligation debt. 
  In 1993, Washington enacted a statute that limits expenditure gro
growth of population and inflation.  The state expenditure limit for any fiscal year is the 
previous fiscal year’s state expenditure limit increased by a percentage rate that equals 
the fiscal growth factor.  The spending limit applied to the general fund, about 80% of 
which covers K-12 education, higher education, medical as
and corrections.  The State General Fund represents approximately half of state 
expenditures.  The other half consists of “dedicated accounts” and federal monies.  The
dedicated accounts allow spending only on specific activ
transportation, and environmental remediation.  Federal funds are excluded from the cap.
  Connecticut’s spending is limited to the average growth of personal incom
the previous five years, or the prior year’s inflation, whichever is greater.  Expendi
are limited, as opposed to appropriations or revenue.  Expenditures ex
include: 1) payments on principal or interest of bonds, notes, and other forms of 
indebtedness, 2) state grants to distressed municipalities, and 3) first year expenditures on
federal mandates or court orders.  A three-fifths vote to enact the definition of “general 
budget expenditures” has not yet been achieved.  The expenditure limits can be rela
with three-fifths vote of the members of both h
up approximately 17 % of Connecticut’s General Fund Revenue, are included in 
capped funds (those to which the spending applies).  Including federal funds in the 
expenditures affected by the spending cap hampers Connecticut’s ability to utilize federal 
funds.   
  Federally matched funds are funds available to states, but for which states must 
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project could overextend the state, because federal funding is sometimes offered to create 





siness cycles.  In years following an 
ars 
 
faces an increasing burden of continuing support for the new program, as federal suppo
decreases.  Thus, there may be an incentive to include discretionary federal funds in
cap because that would discourage states from accepting federal funds that may dimin
or disappear. 
   Tying expenditure growth to the five-year moving average growth rate in pers
income links current expenditures to past bu
expansion, this would tend to relax the spending cap, but would tighten the cap in ye
following a contraction.  Other states use three-year average growth rates, but 
Connecticut is alone in using a five-year average.  This longer period impedes 
Connecticut’s ability to change spending behavior in response to rapidly changing 
economic conditions.  On the other hand, it smoothes the spending rule and reduces 
volatility.      
  Because debt service is excluded from its spending cap, Connecticut tends to use
bonds for funding not only capital expenditures, but also to cover operating expenditure 
shortfalls.  In paying the interest premium on borrowed funds, Connecticut increases its 
operating expenses, costs that could be averted with a relaxation of expenditure 
limitations.  Connecticut sometimes spends less than the cap would allow exacerbating 
future years’ expenditures, because the base to which the spending rule is applied is 





Appendix II: A Chronology of Connecticut’s Spending Rule 
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  Lowell Weicker was elected Governor in 1990 in the midst of an economic and 
scal crisis for the State of Connecticut.  His signature proposal was a state income tax 
at the legislature adopted in a special session in 1991.  During that same special 
it the growth of state 
ending as well as a statutory limit on the growth of state spending.  Although the 
constitutional amendment was approved by state voters in November 1992, and it is now 
part of the state constitution, the amendment has never been implemented because it 
required the legislature, by 3/5 vote, to adopt certain definitions.  To quote the 
amendment: 
The general assembly shall by law define "increase in personal income", 
"increase in inflation" and "general budget expenditures" for the purposes of this 
section and may amend such definitions, from time to time, provided general 
budget expenditures shall not include expenditures for the payment of bonds, 
notes or other evidences of indebtedness.  The enactment or amendment of 
such definitions shall require the vote of three-fifths of the members of each 
house of the general assembly.
17
 
  To date, the legislature has not adopted these definitions.  However, in a separate 
action, the same 1991 special session adopted a statutory spending cap that limits 
expenditures “authorized by the General Assembly.”  That statute, Sec. 2-33a of the 
Connecticut General Statutes is in effect today and has been since it became law more 
than a decade ago.  Pursuant to an opinion of the Attorney General, issued April 14, 
1993, the current statutory cap remains in place until the General Assembly enacts the 
definitions required by the constitution, by a three-fifths majority.
18
  During that same term, the legislature also changed the budgeting calendar to 
require 2-year budgets to be submitted by the Governor at the beginning of each odd 
numbered year. 
  What has happened to the state budget under the cap?  We begin with Governor 
Weicker’s proposal made in 1993 for the 1993-95 biennium, the first two-year proposal 
under the cap. 
 
                                                
fi
th
session, the legislature adopted a constitutional amendment to lim
sp
 
17 Connecticut State Constitution, Connecticut General Statutes Revised to 1993. 









1993-94, are uncapped expenditures.  However, these first year costs are included in the 
1993-94 capped base when calculating the 1994-95 cap.”
21
 
                        
 
Governor Weicker’s proposal (dollars in millions):
 
 
FY93 estimated expenditure:  $8,120.3 
 
FY93 appropriated base: $8,155.6  capped $6,602.1            uncapped $1,553.5 
FY94 recommended:      $8,636.0  capped $6,951.4 +5.3% uncapped $1,684.6 +8.4% 
 
FY94 for 95 cap:       $8,636.0  capped $6,996.8             uncapped $1,639.2 
FY95 recommended:       $9,065.0  capped $7,275.2 +4.0% uncapped $1,789.8 
 
19
g cap in Fiscal Year 1994-95 is set at 4.49%.  The proposed budget comes in at 
35 million under the spending cap in each year of the biennium.”
20
million, which are the first year costs of Federal and Court mandates in Fiscal 
 
Data on pages A-6 and A-7 show that FY 93-94 proposal is exactly $35.0 under cap 






    All  app  .  Capped Noncapped 
1992-93    $8,228.4  $6,618.5  $1,609.9 
1993-94    $8589.5  $6,953.4  $1,636.1
1993-94*    $8,589.5  $6,972.8  $1,616.7 
1994-95    $9,038.2  $7,259.8  $1,778.7 
 
*for FY95 cap calculation 
 
                          
get Summary 1993-95 (Feb. 1993), A-5. 
 Governor’s Budget Summary 1993-95 (Feb. 1993), 10. 
 Governor’s Budget Summary 1993-95 (Feb. 1993), A-5. 
22 Governor’s Budget Summary 1993-95 (Feb. 1993), A-6 & A-7. 




23 Connecticut State Budget 1993-95, Office of Fiscal Analysis, Connecticut Gene




Governor Proposed budget adjustments (dollars in millions): 
993-94  (legislature  appropriated)    $8,589.5 
d base  $8,677.3 
994-95 previous appropriation      $9,038.1  ($26.5 under cap) 
 – from a 
994-95  recommendation    $9,094.1 $7,289.4 $1,804.7 
ted Base.”
6-97 4.23% 




pted in 1993, under cap by $26.4 
ised, under cap by $53.4 
The difference between the two numbers for 1993-94 is explained as follows:  “For 1993-
4, includes $113.5 million for Debt Service (from 1992-93 General Fund surplus) per 
ion (per SA 94-12); “uncompensated 
 
1
1993-94 (Governor’s revised appropriate
1
1994-95 recommendation        $9,094.1  ($13.4 under cap
different base) 
 
     Total   Capped Uncapped 
1993-94 app. Base      $8,608.1  $6,964.4  $1,643.7 
1
 
The 1993-94 appropriated base is lowered because it “includes removed of Industry 














The legislature adopted a revis
but further under the cap!  That is because changes adopted in 1994 increased 1
“capped” expenditures to $7,335.2 to total appropriated funds: 
 
1993-94  $9,038.2 (after 1994 action basis for calculating 1993-94 CAP
993-94  $9,225.9 (after 1994 action basis for calculating 1994-95 CAP 1
1994-95  $9,038.2 ado
994-95  $9,484.8 rev 1
 
Sec. 53(b) of PA 93-80; deficiencies of $83.5 mill
                                                 
24 Governor’s Midterm Budget Adjustments, February 1994, p. A-5. 
25 Governor’s Midterm Budget Adjustments, February 1994, p. A-4. 
40  
care appropriations” of $289.8 million (see PA 94-9)\, and an appropriation of $149.6 
 PA 94-1, MSS.”




John Rowland was elected Gove in  a rnor   1994 nd presented his first 2-year budget to the 
in  illions . 
: $ ,435.9  cappe 6+1. ped 5.57% 
Y96 for 97 cap:   $9,435.9  capped $7,396.4          uncapped $2,039.5 
ncapped expenditures.  However, these first year costs are included in the 1995-96 
cap. 
6 budget is $126.2 or 1.3% below the cap.  1996-97 is $246.6 or 2.5% 




995-96      $9,792.8  $7,714.0  $2,078.8   ($84.8 under cap) 
,204.9   ($62.5 under cap) 
 cap
legislature in 1995(dollars  m )
 
FY95 appropriated base: $9,193.8  capped  $7,257.3        uncapped $1,936.5 
FY96 recommended 9   d  $7,391. 85% uncap  $2,044.3 +
 
F
FY97 recommended: $9,581.7 capped $7,424.2 +0.38% uncapped  $2,157.5 +5.79% 
 
First year costs of Federal and Court Mandates in fiscal 1995-96 of $4.8 million are 
u








Legislature adopted budget: 
 
    All  app  .  Capped Non
1994-95    $9,484.8  $7,528.5  $1,9
1
 
1995-96*    $9,792.8  $7,720.4  $2,072.4 
1996-97      $10,149.2  $7,944.3  $2
*for FY97  calculation
28
 
                                                 
26 Connecticut State Budget 1993-95 Revisions, Office of Fiscal Analysis, Connecticut General Assembly 
(July 1994), p. 33. 
27 1995-1997 Governor’s Budget Summary, February 1995, pp. A-6 to A-8. 
ecticut General Assembly, July 1995, 
28 Connecticut State Budget 1995-97, Office of Fiscal Analysis Conn
pp. 37-38. 
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Note that for cap purposes, the legislature uses as the 1994-95 base the same figure 
($9,484.8) that was appropriated during the 1994 session.  This is higher than the 1994-





Governor’s Proposed budget adjustments (dollars in millions): 
+4.04% 
nd 
come growth) so 1.84% is well below 
ap.
n: 
 by $212.0 million.  The Governor’s revised 
commendations were under the cap by $123.6 million for FY ’97”
30
reased because the 1995-96 base was raised and the amount 
origi l bud t): 
  $10,022.0 
Note this was a reduction in spending that had nothing to do with the spending cap.  The 
budget was already well under the spending cap but it was reduced even more.  In our 
ent, this is a revenue driven phenomenon.  Even after adoption of these reductions 
                      
 
    Total   Capped  Uncapped 
995-96 Appropriated Base:  $9,849.3  $7,776.9     $2,072.4  1
1996-97 Recommended:  $10,076.3  $7,920.1 +1.84%   $2,156.2 
 
he 1995-96 base has been revised to reflect estimated deficiencies of $76.5 million a T
total de-appropriations of $20 million. 
 





“For the 1996-97 fiscal year, the calculation of the spending cap shows the budget as 
amended to be under the cap
re
The amount under the cap inc
spend was reduced. 
 
995-96 ( na ge $9,792.8  1
1996-96 (revised in 1996):  $9,861.0 
 
$10,149.2  1996-97 (original budget): 
996-97 (revised in 1996): 1
 
judgm
                            
996, pp. A-5 to A-7. 
. 41. 
29 1995-1997 Biennium Governor’s Midterm Budget Adjustments, February 1
30 Connecticut State Budget 1995-97 Revisions, Office of Fiscal Analysis, Connecticut General Assembly, 
July 1996, p
42  
“A total estimated shortfall of approximately $10.0 million ($7.5 million General Fu
and $2.5 million Transportation Fund) could result in FY 1996-97 as a result of several 
arbitrated (last best offer) contracts related to Judic
nd 
ial employees and other units . . . .”
31
During the 1996 Session, a bill (SB 544) to implement the constitutional amendment [on 
nding cap] failed to achieve the two-thirds vote necessary.”
32  [Note:  the 








Governor’s proposed budget for the biennium (dollars in millions).  
ped  $8,047.9         uncapped  $2,162.0 
ed   $7,983.3 -0.80%  uncapped $2,181.0 +0.88% 
recommended:   $10,311.5   capped $8,039.9 +0.56%  uncapped $2,271.6 +4.71% 
ap for 97-98 is +3.97%, and capped budget is down so is well under cap.   




  $8,070.8  $2,212.2 
  $8,178.1  $2,199.6 ($213.1 under cap) 
$8,189.0  $2,188.7 
$8,225.0  $2,306.8 ($325.1 under cap) 
 
FY97 appropriated base: $10,209.9  cap
FY98 recommended: $10,164.3      capp
 




Cap for 98-99 is +4.
According to OFA, “The Governor’s recommendations were under the cap by $384.1 
million for FY 98 and by $307.6 million for FY 99. 
 




    All  app  . 
1996-97:    $10,283.0
997-98:      $10,377.7 1
 
1997-98:*    $10,377.7 
998-99      $10,531.8  1
 
*for FY99 cap calculation
34
                                                 
31 Connecticut State Budget 1995-97 Revisions, Office of Fiscal Analysis, Connecticut General Assembly, 
July 1996, p. 41. 
embly, 
or’s Budget Summary, February 1997, pp. A-5 to A-8. 
32 Connecticut State Budget 1995-97 Revisions, Office of Fiscal Analysis, Connecticut General Ass





Governor Proposed budget adjustments (dollars in millions): 
 
        Total              Capped    Uncapped 
1997-98 Appropriated Base:  $10,502.4  $8,313.7    $2,188.7 
1998-99 Recommended:  $10,927.0  $8,648.4 +4.03%  $2,278.6 +4.1
 
Total appropriated funds for fiscal 1997-98 have been revised to reflect estimated 
deficiencies of $106.
1% 
4 million and an additional appropriation of $18.3 million for the 
 program.
35
997-98      $10,608.2  $8,390.8  $2,217.4   ($0.4 under cap) 
998-99      $10,994.7  $8,730.7  $2,264.0    ($82.3 under cap) 
2.3 
et was under the cap by 69.3 million. 
issued a 
of . .  .extraordinary circumstances” to allow for the 
atutory spending cap to be exceeded after a three-fifths vote by the General Assembly.  
 resu ing in  $115
formation 
otali  $194  milli ona
 1998 session with regard to the constitutional spending cap.
36
                                                                                                                                                
HUSKY
 
Legislature revised budget: 
 
    All  app  .  Capped Noncapped 
1996-97    $10,283.0  $,070.8 $2,212.2 
1
 
1997-98*    $10,608.2  $8,404.5  $2,203.7 
1
 
* base for calculating FY99 cap. 
 
According to OFA, “The FY 1998-99 budget is under the statutory spending cap by $8
million.  The governor’s revised recommended budg
 
“On May 1, 1998, after six consecutive years of budget surpluses, the governor 
declaration of “the existence 
st
For the first time since its adoption in 1991, the statutory spending cap was 
exceeded, lt  a .0 million appropriation for the tax rebate program, and a 
$79.5 million appropriation for the year 2000 problem for the state’s 1,500 in
systems, t ng .5 on in additi l FY 1997-98 appropriations.” 
 
No action was taken in the
 
te Budget 1997-99 Revisions, Office of Fiscal Analysis Connecticut General Assembly, 
34 Connecticut State Budget 1997-99, Office of Fiscal Analysis Connecticut General Assembly, September 
1997, pp. 52-53. 
35 1997-1999 Biennium Governor’s Midterm Budget Adjustments, February 1998, pp. A-6 to A-8. 
36 Connecticut Sta




Governor Rowland’s proposed budget for the biennium (dollars in millions). 
Y99 A propr ted B e: $11             cappe
 $9,177.4 +4.04% uncapped $2,397.2 +6.37% 








This is the second year in a row that the cap has been exceeded since its adoption in 
ral 
 
F p ia as ,074.8 capped $8,821.2 un d $2,253.6 
FY00 Recommended:  $11,574.6 capped
 
F
FY01 Recommended: $12,126.7   capped $9,619.2 +4.75% uncapped $2,507.5 +4.
 




egislature adopted budget:  L
 
    All  app  .  Capped Noncapped 
1998-99    $11,074.8  $8,821.2  $2,253.6 
999-00      $11,618.9  $9,200.7  $2,418.2  ($68.6 under cap)  1
 
  1999-00*   $11,618.9  $9,216.1  $2,402.9 
000-01      $12,156.8  $9,632.3  $2,524.5  ($59.3 under cap)  2
 
for FY01 cap calculation  *
 
According to OFA, “The 1999-2001 biennial budget is under the statutory spending cap 
by $68.6 million for FY 00 and 59.3 million for FY01.  The governor’s original 
recommended budget was under the cap by $91.9 million for FY00 and $39.7 million for
FY 01.  However, this did not include the nursing home settlement reached shortly
the submittal of the budget.  Incorporating the costs of that settlement ($62.2 million for 
FY 00 and $67.9 million for FY 01) into the Governor’s recommended budget w
have put it under the cap by $29.7 million in FY 00 and $37.2 million in FY 01. 
 
“On June 4, 1999, after seven consecutive years of budget surpluses, the governor issued
a declaration of “the existence of . .  extraordinary circumstances” to allow f
statutory spending cap to be exceeded after a three-fifths vote by the General Assembly.  
1991.  Prior to the passage of the appropriations act, SA 99-10 the FY 99 budget was 
under the cap by $2.3 million.  The act appropriated $511.2 million from the Gene
                                                 
37 Governor’s Budget Summary 1999-2001, February 1999, pp. A-4 to A-5. 
45  





.  As a result the FY 99 budget exceeded the statutory spending cap by $525.7
 
No action was taken in the 1999 session with regard to the constitutional spendi
 
2  
   Total   Capped  Uncapped 
-00 Appropriated Base:  $11,686.6  $9,283.7    $2,402.9 
000-01 Recommended:         $12,267.6   $9,708.3 +4.57%          $2,559.3 +6.51% 
otal appropriated funds for fiscal 1999-00 have been revised to reflect estimated 
ap set at +5.48%.
39
e rev ed bu get: 
ppropriated.      Capped Noncapped 
998-99    $11,074.8            $8,821.1  $2,253.6 
place 
PA funds, which were not subject to appropriation.”  
) that 
 














   All  a
1
1999-00    $11,687.1            $9,268.9  $2,418.2 ($0.4 under cap) 
 
1999-00*   $11,714.2   $9,311.2  $2,532.8 
2000-01    $12,305.0    $9,772.2  $2,532.8 ($49.4 under cap) 
 
* base for calculating FY01 cap.   
 
“The FY 00 base was adjusted to reflect the level of the Job Training Partnership Act 
(JTPA) funds the state is to receive in FY01.  Workforce Investment Act funds re
JT
 
“FY00 Total appropriations excludes appropriations of surplus ($498.7 million
put total appropriations over the cap by $498.3 million.” 
 
                                                 
38 Connecticut State Budget 1999-2001, Office of Fiscal Analysis Connecticut General Assembly, 
September 1999, pp. 55-57. 
000, pp. A-4 to A-6. 
39 1999-2001 Biennium Governor’s Midterm Budget Adjustments, February 2
46  
According to OFA:  “The revised FY01 budget is under the statutory spending cap by 
$49.4 million, compared to the original FY01 budget which was under the cap by $59.3 
million.  The governor’s revised recommended budget was under the cap by $84.1 
On May 3, 2000, after eight consecutive years of budget surpluses, the governor issued a 
s” to allow for the statutory 




xceeded by $98.3 million (when additional surplus 
ppropriations of $255.5 million for school construction grants and $10 million for 
uded in accordance with Section 72 of SA 00-13). 





declaration of “the existence of . .  extraordinary circumstance
sp
the third year in a row that the cap ha doption  s been exceeded since its a in 1991.
The original FY00 budget was under the cap by $68.6 million.  As a result of surplu
spending of $498.7 million and deficiency appropriations of $68.2 million, the FY 
spending cap was effectively e
a
school wiring are incl
 




overnor o dget for the nnium (dollars i ions):  G  prop sed bu  bie n mill
omm nded:  ca ed $10,172.8+3.76% uncapped $2,717.1 +6.27% 
capped $10,174.8         uncapped  $2,715.1 
 
he Cap was set at 5.33% for FY 2001-2002 and 5.53% for FY 2002-2003.
41
 
                                                
 
propr ated Ba 0.6  FY01 Ap i se: $12,36 capped $9,803.9           uncapped    $2,556.7 
Y02 Rec e     $12,889.9 pp F
 
Y02 For 03 Cap:  $12,889.9  F
FY03 Recommended: $13,446.5 capped $10,656.9 +4.74%  uncapped $2,789.6+2.74%
 
Total Appropriated Funds for fiscal 2000-2001 have been revised to reflect estimated 








40 Connecticut State Budget 1999-2001 Revisions, Office of Fiscal Analysis Connecticut General 
Assembly, July 2000, pp. 47-4
41 Governor’s Budget Summary 2001-2003, February 2001, pp. A-4 to A-5. 
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Legislature adopted budget: 
 
    All  appro.  Capped Noncapped 
1999-00    $11,714.24  $9,294.46  $2,419.68 
2000-01 
cap 
  $12,360.89  $9,803.86  $2,557.03  ($0.00    under) 
oses 
eeded for the 
urth time since it was adopted in 1991.  The revised FY 01 budget was under the 
riated a net total of $55.6 million for FY 01, leaving no room under the cap in FY 
1.  Therefore, by making $608.1 million in original FY 01 surplus appropriations, the 
 by $608.1 million, 
ated to 
ch 
r issued a declaration of “the existence of … extraordinary 
et 
rpluses, sufficient funds to fund fully the Budget Reserve Fund, and the requirement 
r additional state funds for other needs. 
Both the spending cap and revenues acted as a constraint on the biennial budget.  The 
spending cap again became a restraint on the appropriation for the biennium.  However, 
 
2000-01    $12,360.58  $9,744.00  $2,616.58 
2001-02      $12,947.00  $10,185.18  $2,761.82   ($78.17 under 
cap) 
 
2001-02*    $12,947.00  $10,214.39  $2,732.61 
2002-03      $13,517.98  $10,716.29  $2,801.69   ($62.97 under 
cap) 
 
*for FY03 cap calculation
42
 
“Spending Cap Exceeded for FY 01.  In order to appropriate sums for specific purp
outlined in the above table of surplus spending, the spending cap was exc
fo
spending cap by $55.6 million.  Three deficiency bills (SA 01-4, SA 01-5 and SA 01-9) 
approp
0
budget act in effect resulted in the FY 01 budget being over the cap
with the remainder intended for the rainy day fund.  The fund is specifically design
receive any excess monies beyond that which is appropriated from surplus up to 5% of 
the following year’s net General Fund appropriation. 
 
“To exceed the spending cap requires a three-fifths vote by the General Assembly, whi
was obtained after the Governo





                                                 
42 Connecticut State Budget 2001-2003, Office of Fiscal Analysis Connecticut General Assembly, August 
2001, p. 46. 
48  
the need to keep the budget equal to forecasted revenues also was a major limiting factor 
o the five-
which ever 
ercent.  For FY 03 the growth rate is projected to be 5.53 percent.”
43
on expenditures.  The spending cap limits year-to-year growth in expenditures t
year average in personal income growth or the twelve-month rate of inflation, 





Governor Rowland’s proposed budget adjustments (dollars in millions): 
 
    Total   Capped  Uncapped 
001- 2 02 Appropriated Base:  $12,919.7  $10,207.7    $2,712.0 




dget by lowering the appropriation 




plus spending.  The spending cap largely 
mited surplus spending to one-time items.  The FY 03 revised appropriation is $363 
2002-03 Recommended: 
 
Total appropriated funds for fiscal 2001-2002 have been revised to reflect an additional 
deficiency appropriation of $4.6 million. 




Legislature revised budget: 
 
“The original biennial State Budget, as approved by the 2001 General Assembly for FY
03 (the second year of the 2001-03 biennium), was $13.52 billion.  However, due to 
fiscal constraints it was necessary to reduce the overall level of expenditures.  The 2002
session of the General Assembly revised the FY 03 bu
fo
 
“For the first time in five years, the limitation placed upon the budget by the statutory 
spending cap was not a factor in arriving at the level of appropriations.  With surp
excess of $500 million over the last five years, the spending cap limited both the growth
in expenditures as well as the nature of sur
li
                                                 
43 Connecticut State Budget 2001-2003, Office of Fiscal Analysis Connecticut General Assembly, August 
2001, p. 9. 
44 2001-2003 Biennium Governor’s Midterm Budget Adjustments, February 2002, pp. A-4 to A-5. 
ugust 2002, p. 7. 
45 Connecticut State Budget 2001-2003 Revisions, Office of Fiscal Analysis Connecticut General 
Assembly, A
49  
million under the statutory spending cap.  It had been $63 million under the cap in the 




Governor Rowland’s proposed budget for the biennium (dollars in millions): 
ppropriated Base: $13,132.6 capped $10,425.6  uncapped  $2,707.2 




ppropriations of $85 million. 
  All  app  .  Capped Noncapped 
001-02    $12,925.3  $10,210.5  $2,714.8 
$13,217.8  $10,467.4  $2,750.4 ($376.1 under cap) 
hority – Section 60 





Y04 for 03 Cap:    $13,542.7 capped $0,683.0                 uncapped $2 F
FY05 Recommended:   $14,116.4 capped $11,096.0 +3.87% uncapped $3,020.4+5.62
 
Total Appropriated Funds for fiscal 2002-03 have been revised to reflect estimated d
a
The Cap was set at 5.27% for FY 2003-2004 and 4.48% for FY 2004-2005.
46




2002-03     
 
2002-03    $13,217.8  $10,475.9  $2,741.9 
2003-04      $13,520.5  $10,672.0  $2,848.5 ($356.0 under cap) 
 
2003-04    $13,520.5  $10,672.0  $2,848.5 




The legislature also gave the Governor “Extraordinary Rescission Aut
of PA 03-1 June Special Session, gives the Governor expanded temporary rescission 
authority.  For FY 05, if the Governor determines there is a fiscal exigency that cannot be 
remedied under his existing authority, he may make additional rescissions up to $55 
million.  These expanded rescissions may not exceed an additional 5 percent of any 
appropriations or a fund beyond the governor’s current authority.”
48
 
ut State Budget 2003-2005, Office of Fiscal Analysis Connecticut General Assembly, August 
August 
46 2003-2005 Governor’s Budget Summary, February 2003, pp. A-4 to A-5 
47 Connectic
2003, p. 12. 
48 Connecticut State Budget 2003-2005, Office of Fiscal Analysis Connecticut General Assembly, 





Biennial budget adopted previous year in deficit. 
rom Governor’s midterm budget adjustments: 
What accounts for the better budgetary position going into the recession?  The spending 
tween 
o 
s added to the spending base so as to inflate spending in 
The lesson learned:  while many complained about the supposed inflexibility of the 
would do 
   Total   Capped  Uncapped 










cap, of course!  It has been the taxpayers’ best friend these past dozen years or so.” 
 
“While the spending cap has been exceeded in several occasions by agreement be
the Governor and legislature, the monies were spent largely on debt avoidance and 
retirement and one-time projects that did not add to ongoing spending growth.  And at n
time were the extra expenditure
the out-years or to create new programs with ongoing costs.” 
 
“
spending cap in good revenue times, it did exactly what the framers expected it 
49 – it controlled everyone’s appetite to grow beyond our long-term means.”
 
Governor Proposed budget adjustments (dollars in millions): 
 
 
2003-04 Appropriated Base:  $13,618.4  $10,768.1    $2,850.3 
2004-05 Recommended:  $14,235.3  $11,200.0+4.01%  $3,035.3 +6.49% 
 
T
of $66.2 million in FY 2003-04 deficiencies, $11.7 million for TANF Bonus, and $20.0 
million in CATCH-F in the General Fund.  This lowers amount FY05 budget would b
under the spending cap from $119.2 million to $58.6 million. 
The cap for FY 2004-05 is set at 4.46%.  Raising base of FY04 appropriation provide
additional room under the spending cap, allowing the governor to add $179.2 million
over the FY05 enacted budget.
50
                    
005 Governor’s Midterm Budget Adjustments, February 4, 2004, pp. A-4 & A-5. 




The budget revisions reflect an FY 05 all funds appropriated base of $14,322.1, which 
.  This calculation is based 




 Reserve for Salary 
djustments account, which is used to fund collectively bargained labor agreements, 
ion 
ducation 
atching Grants and $3.95 million of additional miscellaneous appropriations.  In 
ncies in the current fiscal 
nd 
mil din 5 
udget being under the cap by $129.1 million.”
 
“
results in the FY 05 budget being 129.1 million under the cap
upon adjustments made to the base of all funds a
 
“Appropriations made in FY 04 have a significant impact on the calculation of the 
spending cap.  In the original FY 05 budget, the total funds appropriated for FY 04 w
$356 million under the spending cap.  The revised budget includes several appropriations
that raise the level of all funds and reduce the amount by which the FY 04 budget is
under the spending cap.  Those appropriations include $234.9 million in deficiencies and 
additional appropriations.  Additional appropriations for FY 04 include $5 million for 
interim rate increases for nursing homes, $48.4 million for the
A
$11.7 million in federal TANF block grant bonus funds, $20 million for the Commiss
on Culture and Tourism, $30 million for the continuation of HUSKY Adults in FY 05 as 
mandated by the federal court, $25.3 million for the Department of Higher E
M
addition, $90.5 million is appropriated to cover agency deficie
year.  These additional appropriations raise the base total funds to $13.755.4 million a








Gov. Rowland resigned in 2004 and the Lt. Gov. Jodi Rell became Governor.  Governor 
                                                
Rell will present her first budget to the legislature in January 2005. 
 
General 
51 Connecticut State Budget 2003-2005 Revisions, Office of Fiscal Analysis Connecticut 
Assembly, August 2004, pp. 8-9. 
52 